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ABSTRACT
This article examines the representation of human 
genomics in the British historical novel of the 1990s. A 
form which meditates on the past and its relationship 
to the present, the historical novel readily lends itself to 
the exploration of genealogy, heredity and inheritance. 
Forwarding an understanding of human history, and 
particularly of family history, as a direct and causal 
function of the genes, the neo- Darwinian explanation 
of the genome popular in the 1990s similarly advanced 
its own teleological relationship between past and 
present. Reading Jenny Diski’s Monkey’s Uncle 
(1994), A S Byatt’s Babel Tower (1996) and Zadie 
Smith’s White Teeth (2000), this essay argues that the 
historical novel provides a unique form with which to 
critique the deterministic view of heredity promoted 
by neo- Darwinism. Focusing on moments of textual 
anachronism, asynchronicity and repetition in these 
family sagas, it shows how—at its most transgressive—
the historical novel imagines temporal disruptions that 
bring the present into contact with the past in ways 
that defamiliarise conventions of linearity, order and 
progress. Refusing the idea of human history as a single, 
legible line that underpins neo- Darwinian ideas of 
genetic inheritance, Diski, Byatt and Smith’s novels are 
able to interrogate both the temporal logics and cultural 
capital of 1990s genetic science. While the decade was 
shaped and defined by popular science speculation and 
large- scale genetic research projects, such as the Human 
Genome Project (1990–2003), the novels addressed in 
this essay ultimately suggest the lively and seductive 
genocentrism of the 1990s to be inadequate to the task 
of explaining the complexity and meaning of the lived 
genome. As Diski, Byatt and Smith’s novels anticipate, the 
question of the uses, meanings and value of the human 
genome sequence continue to be of relevance within our 
current, postgenomic era.
INTRODUCTION
A form which meditates on the past and its rela-
tionship to the present, the historical novel 
readily lends itself to the exploration of gene-
alogy, heredity and inheritance. Its exploration of 
the interconnection between past and present can 
both consolidate and disrupt existing narratives. 
At its most conservative, the hermeneutic gaze of 
the historical novel comprises a form of genealog-
ical or teleological thinking, which allows us to 
imagine the past as a direct and causal explanation 
of the present.1 Conversely, as Elizabeth Freeman 
observes, the historical novel can disrupt and even 
refuse to connect the past legibly to the present 
by use of such forms as asynchrony, anachronism, 
anastrophe, belatedness, delay, ellipsis, flashback, 
surprise, compression, pause, prolepsis, repetition 
and reversal.2 At its most transgressive, then, the 
historical novel might comprise a form of temporal 
disruption, bringing the present into intimate 
contact with the past, but in a manner that defamil-
iarises existing understandings of linearity, progress 
and order.
In this essay, the disruptive potential of the 
historical novel is seen to offer a critique to the 
neat, teleological view of heredity promoted by 
neo- Darwinist science in the 1990s. Emphasising 
an understanding of human history, and particu-
larly of family history, as ordered, teleological and 
sequential, the neo- Darwinian idea of the gene as 
singular and stable promoted a direct and causal 
relationship between past and present. As the neo- 
Darwinian ‘unit of heredity’, the gene comprised a 
symbol of continuity that was treated as function-
ally indivisible: ‘a gene travels intact from grand-
parent to grandchild, passing straight through the 
intermediate generation without being merged with 
other genes’.3 For Richard Dawkins, one of the 
founding proponents of neo- Darwinism, genes are 
as good as immortal, ‘leaping from body to body 
down the generations’, comprising a symbol of 
stability and continuity that was seen as represent-
ative of linear human progress, through millions of 
years.4 As Patricia Waugh and others have argued, 
in promoting a reductive and deterministic idea of 
genetics, neo- Darwinist ideas moved away from 
Darwinism, with its focus on the interdependence 
of embodied interactions of living organisms within 
their variable and shifting environments.5 Though 
the present, postgenomic age might arguably have 
recovered this awareness of the interdependence of 
organism and environment, the 1990s were shaped 
by the determinist paradigms of neo- Darwinian 
genomics. The popularity of a genomic approach 
that reduced all aspects of human life to the genes 
can be seen reflected in the beginning of the Human 
Genome Project in 1990, which aimed to unravel 
the secrets of human nature through a detailed 
examination of human genes and their functions.6 
For proponents of this genomic model, then, no 
aspect of human existence was beyond the reach of 
a wholly genetic account, with genes being directly 
invoked to explain complex aspects of the human 
condition such as sexual orientation, mental illness 
and intelligence.7
However, if the ideological and intellectual 
history of science of the 1990s was thoroughly 
neo- Darwinian, literature, and in particular histor-
ical fiction, was not so easily seduced. As the critic 
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‘Natural History: the Retro- Victorian Novel’ (1998), the 1990s 
saw an increasing engagement between the historical novel and 
the life sciences. Paying particular attention to Graham Swift’s 
Ever After (1992) and A S Byatt’s Morpho Eugenia (1992), Shut-
tleworth’s essay considers how historical fiction of the era revis-
ited and reconsidered the cultural impact of evolutionary theory. 
Reimagining the religious, social and technological upheavals of 
the nineteenth century, novels such as Ever After and Morpho 
Eugenia form part of a large corpus of neo- Victorian novels 
that likewise engage with the Victorian naturalists, including 
Penelope Lively’s City of the Mind (1991), Simon Mawers’ 
Mendel’s Dwarf (1997), Andrea Barrett’s The Voyage of the 
Narwhal (1998) and A S Byatt’s The Biographer’s Tale (2000).8
Beyond this neo- Victorian corpus, there remains a wealth of 
underexamined 1990s British historical novels which address 
the contemporary significance of scientific theories of heredity 
and inheritance. Works such as Penelope Fitzgerald’s The Gate 
of Angels (1990), Ian McEwan’s Black Dogs (1992), Hilary 
Mantel’s A Change of Climate (1994) and Margaret Drabbles’ 
Peppered Moth (2000) all engage with the long legacy of Darwin 
in the 20th century. Though the following analysis builds on 
the pioneering critical work discussed previously, it is on this 
body of contemporary historical fiction that this essay focuses. 
Exploring Jenny Diski’s Monkey’s Uncle (1994), A S Byatt’s 
Babel Tower (1996) and Zadie Smith’s White Teeth (2000), 
the essay examines how these novels critique and contest the 
epistemological authority of neo- Darwinian genetics. Like the 
Victorian naturalists of Ever After and Morpho Eugenia, each of 
these novels features a contemporary scientific protagonist who 
represents the cultural authority of science and, in particular, 
genetics. However, while their protagonists endorse the popular 
genetic determinism of the 1990s, the texts ultimately suggest 
such genocentrism to be inadequate to the task of explaining the 
complexity and meaning of the lived genome. As I argue, these 
historical novels subvert the linear teleology of neo- Darwinian 
genetics. Focusing on moments of textual anachronism, asyn-
chronicity and repetition, this essay explores Diski, Byatt and 
Smith’s refusal of the cultural capital and temporal logics of 
neo- Darwinism.
LANGUAGE OF LIFE: NEO-DARWINISM AND ANACHRONISM 
IN BABEL TOWER
Set during the 1960s, Babel Tower focuses on the postwar 
advances in genetics, molecular biology and the computer 
sciences that led to the development of the interdisciplinary 
research programme for understanding the human mind, termed 
the cognitive sciences.9 For one of the novel’s principal focalisers, 
Gerard Wijnnobel, vice chancellor of the fictitious University of 
North Yorkshire, the materialist excitement that accompanied 
the birth of the cognitive sciences transforms the course of 
his professional and intellectual life. Byatt portrays Wijnnobel 
as part of the first wave of linguistic nativism that emerged 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and which argued that the 
rules of language were hard- wired within the human brain—a 
stance commonly understood to have originated with Noam 
Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957). Chomsky proposed that 
complex linguistic structures are innate to the mind, comprising 
a universal grammar that allows for the possibility of language. 
As Byatt describes in Babel Tower:
Gerard Wijnnobel is convinced intellectually that Chomsky is right: 
that the human brain is born with a capacity to generate and trans-
form language – that this is innate, not absorbed into some empty 
bucket or inscribed on some tabula rasa, but there in the folds of the 
cortex, the dendrites and synapses and axons of the neurones in the 
brain. The theories, both of learning and of language, that preced-
ed this one are more interested in the way the mind is formed and 
shaped by society, or by learning, or by random events.10
Crucially, however, the theories that Byatt attributes to Wijn-
nobel concerning the nature and acquisition of language in 
Babel Tower go far beyond what Chomsky himself was willing 
to affirm. As the narrator observes, Wijnnobel is committed to a 
purely material model of the origin of language that fuses clas-
sical genetics with the sciences of mind in a manner that more 
broadly parallels the genomic arguments advanced by neo- 
Darwinian thinkers in the early 1990s.
The rise of neo- Darwinism resulted in a second wave of 
linguistic nativism in the last decade of the 20th century, which 
centred genetics as the vehicle for a universal grammar. Of this 
later wave of nativist thought, it is the work of Steven Pinker 
that comprises the most visible and influential conception of 
language as resulting from evolution. While Chomsky’s own 
ambivalence regarding Darwinism has been noted,11 the second 
wave did not share this scepticism and was eager to ascribe a 
genetic basis to human language. Neo- Darwinian thinkers such 
as Pinker claimed that if the grammatical structures of language 
were part of human biological endowment, then it would follow 
that such structures were acquired through a gradual process 
of genetically encoded evolution. Wijnnobel’s musings in Babel 
Tower thus directly echo Pinker’s contention that, ‘if there is 
a language instinct, it has to be embodied somewhere in the 
brain, and those brain circuits must have been prepared for their 
role by the genes that built them’.12 Like Pinker, Wijnnobel is 
convinced that, as a biological inheritance, language must be 
determined by genetics. He contends that just as ‘beavers are 
born knowing how to make dams, and as spiders are born with 
the ability to make webs, so human beings are born with the 
ability to speak and think in grammatical forms’.13 This analogy 
is a clear allusion to Daniel Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea 
(1995), wherein the philosopher offers a similar summary of 
genetic inheritance: ‘in the same way that spiders make webs 
and beavers make dams, we make (among many other things) 
books’.14 Wijnnobel’s pronouncements on language in Babel 
Tower thus closely parallel the genetic sensibilities of the second 
wave of linguistic nativism, far more so than they do the earlier 
work of thinkers such as Chomsky.
Byatt’s characterisation of Wijnnobel succeeds not only in 
pointing to the emergence of a first wave of linguistic nativism 
but also its neo- Darwinian reformulation in the 1990s. This 
delicate balance of the historical and the contemporaneous has 
posed a considerable challenge for critics of Byatt’s work. In a 
1996 review of Babel Tower, J M Coetzee remarked that much 
of the genetic and linguistic science in the novel was ‘out of date’ 
at the time of its publication, questioning the relevance of her 
‘devoting so many pages to it’.15 For Alistair Brown, it is not the 
cultural obsolescence of Byatt’s scientific intertexts, but rather 
her anachronistic blending of past and present which provokes. 
Brown contends that Byatt’s anachronism highlights the contin-
gent, constructed nature of science, destabilising its epistemic 
certainty and authority.16 To add to these previous interventions, 
I suggest that it is not only the anachronistic portrayal of 1990s 
science in a 1960s context that is of particular significance. 
Indeed, by alluding so closely to contemporaneous theorists such 
as Pinker and Dennett, Byatt’s portrayal of Wijnnobel is able to 
highlight how the neo- Darwinian moment of the novel’s publi-
cation is shaped by the cultural afterlife of genetic determinism. 
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Byatt is able to inscribe the history of both 1960s and 1990s 
science in Babel Tower.
The motivations that underpin Wijnnobel’s own materi-
alist convictions are founded on a highly personal and partial 
longing. His grandfather, Kees, was a Jewish religious scholar 
who devoted himself to the search for ‘the traces of the Ur- lan-
guage’, the universal speech that supposedly existed in the days 
before Babel.17 Believing his grandfather to have thrown away 
his life chasing this ‘part- mystical, part- historical, part- exegetical’ 
project, Wijnnobel fears that ‘there was a trap, a quirk, a tempta-
tion in the nature of language itself that led people, that induced 
them to spend the whole of their lives on nonsense’.18 The 
impact that his grandfather’s quest has on the young vice chan-
cellor is shown to be both devastating and formative. It is only 
the emergence of molecular genetics that convinces Wijnnobel 
that a truly scientific explanation of human language might be 
possible, provided that the intangible, divine word of creation 
is substituted for the materially encoded information of DNA. 
This transposition allows the human genome to function as the 
graven text of a universal, genetic book of life, that can be read 
and interpreted by the scientist.
Wijnnobel exemplifies how religious narratives linger in 
the form of metaphors, allusions and analogies. Even Pinker’s 
The Language Instinct uses the biblical story of Babel—where 
‘humanity, speaking a single language, came so close to reaching 
heaven that God himself felt threatened’—as an analogy for his 
theory of a shared, biological basis to language.19 Allusions to 
Babel serve a similar function in Byatt’s own text; referencing 
both the bombastic, nativist excitement of the 1960s and 1990s, 
and Wijnnobel’s own hope for a hard- wired, biological basis 
for language. As Wijnnobel’s good friend Vincent Hodgkiss 
observes, the vice chancellor functions as a modern- day ‘[a]rchi-
tect of Babel’ who is ‘intent not on chaos, but on the discovery 
and communication of extraordinary order’.20 The means by 
which Wijnnobel attempts to found and convey this ordered 
vision is through the neo- Darwinian synthesis of genetics and 
evolutionary science. Yet, in alluding so closely to the narrative 
of Babel, Byatt’s text implicitly undermines both Wijnnobel’s 
borrowed scientific authority and the deterministic certainty he 
envisions in the genome.
Part of the larger nature- nurture debate, the controversy 
surrounding the language instinct portrayed in Babel Tower 
further challenges Wijnnobel’s reliability as a source of moral 
authority. As Byatt highlights, the conviction in a universal, 
genetic basis to language provokes moral revulsion in many of 
Wijnnobel’s interlocuters:
To believe that linguistic competence is both innate and unalterable, 
in the present world, smacks of determinism, smacks of predestinari-
anism, and of more unpleasant things, a suggestion that heredity not 
environment, differentiates between men. Many of the men Wijnno-
bel meets find that suggestion morally repugnant, exactly as he found 
his father’s ideas repugnant.21
By alluding to the close relationship between genetic deter-
minism and the spectre of eugenics, Babel Tower gestures to the 
sociopolitical concerns that accompany the genocentric scheme 
of human behaviour. While Wijnnobel is portrayed as disturb-
ingly indifferent to the potential sociopolitical consequences of 
the science he promotes, the characters around Wijnnobel are 
able to express the wider, cultural meaning of his neo- Darwinian 
ideas. As Richard Lewontin and others have noted, in positing 
genetics as the basis of human society, genetic determinism all 
too often naturalises social inequalities, rendering them as the 
result of biology and thus, in practical terms, unalterable.22 
Satirising its principle advocate for genetic determinism, Babel 
Tower shows Wijnnobel to be an ultimately partisan and flawed 
figure. This tension between narrative viewpoints in Byatt’s text 
thereby expresses a genomic scepticism that applies not only to 
the blind faith in genetic possibilities present in the heyday of 
classical genetics but also to the genomic moment of the 1990s 
when the novel was published.
EUGENIC AFTERLIVES: REPETITION AND RACIALISED 
SCIENCE IN WHITE TEETH
Zadie Smith’s White Teeth likewise addresses the lingering legacy 
of eugenics within contemporary genetics, exploring the latter’s 
potential to engender new forms of discrimination. Set primarily 
in the latter half of the 20th century, yet moving freely between 
1857 and 1999, Smith’s saga narrates the lives and loves of 
three families, the Iqbals, the Joneses and the Chalfens. White 
Teeth thus moves beyond Babel Tower’s focus on the politics of 
genetics within the laboratory and the university, to also explore 
its impact in the wider milieu of the household and the play-
ground. In so doing, Smith illustrates how the laboratory and the 
university are unavoidably entangled within the wider communi-
ties in which such institutes are embedded. The fates of all three 
families, then, are shown to be enmeshed with the novel’s explo-
ration of race and racialised science, just as that very science 
is portrayed as being inextricably in relation with the various 
families that comprise the wider community of Smith’s novel.
The unavoidable nature of such entanglement is particularly 
notable in the final scene of White Teeth, when the Iqbals, the 
Joneses and the Chalfens all gather together at a press event, 
held on 31 December 1992, for Marcus Chalfen’s genetic 
project, ‘FutureMouse’. The principal figure of the scientist 
in Smith’s novel, Chalfen works at the fictional Perret Insti-
tute, where he has spent decades experimenting in the field 
of genetic engineering. FutureMouse is the culmination of his 
work—a designer mouse which is genetically programmed to 
die of cancer on a known date, New Year’s Eve, 1999. The aim 
of its creation is to prove that randomness and mutation can 
be eliminated from the genome via bioengineering. Though the 
gathering portends to celebrate this scientific breakthrough and 
the future possibilities Chalfen believes it to afford, it is instead 
the determining weight of history repeating itself that shapes 
the novel’s climax. Past ruptures into present, and the racialised 
science of eugenics re- emerges in the supposedly hygienic and 
apolitical form of contemporary bioengineering, undermining 
the cultural authority of Chalfen’s science and mocking the 
erasure of contingency that his press conference is intended to 
announce.
Despite Chalfen’s repeated assurances over the course of the 
narrative regarding the apolitical nature of his work, it becomes 
apparent that his science possesses an inescapably political 
dimension whose meaning he cannot control or dismiss. The 
institute at which he worked was founded by an alleged Nazi 
collaborator, Dr Pierre Perret. Captured by Archie Jones and 
Samad Iqbal during World War II, Perret is led into the woods 
for a summary execution. After escaping from his captors, the 
reader learns that he emigrated to London, where he proceeded 
to found the Perret Institute for advanced genetic study. It is 
Chalfen himself who stresses the intellectual debt that he feels 
he owes to Dr Perret, characterising the latter as ‘a personal 
inspiration’ and ‘mentor’ who ‘laid the foundations for so much 
of this work’.23 Yet, it is precisely this acknowledgement and 
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present of Smith’s novel, and its cutting- edge genetic science, is 
still haunted by a eugenicist past. As Jerome De Groot observes, 
historical fiction is a form which gives ‘voice’ to ‘ghosts within 
the now, echoes and revenants of history, which still linger and 
exert a modern- day shaping influence.24 Perret, or Dr Sick as 
he is referred to in the closing days of World War II, thus func-
tions as the revenant of White Teeth, literally and metaphorically 
brought back from the dead, whose influence can still be felt in 
the institute he founded, and the genetic work it champions.
Obliviousness on Chalfen’s part to questions of racialised 
science is a recurring theme in Smith’s novel. As Josie Gill 
observes, Chalfen is generally blind to the presence of racism, 
such as when, for example, he fails to realise the charged, racial 
microaggressions present within his own household.25 For Gill, 
‘the scientific removal of the significance of race from genetics 
comes from a position of (often white) privilege which does 
not recognise the ways in which racism is deeply ingrained 
in all parts of society’.26 Thus, Marcus Chalfen and his wife, 
Joyce, espouse a series of racial microaggressions during their 
interactions with Irie Jones and Millat Iqbal, treating them, as 
Gill notes, with a blend of paternalism and sexual exoticism.27 
Marcus Chalfen pantomimes the ‘foreign syllables’ of ‘Mill- yat 
Ick- Ball’,28 while Joyce remarks that he is ‘gorgeous’ and ‘Like 
Omar Sharif thirty years ago’.29 Irie Jones is treated in a similar 
manner as a ‘big brown goddess’,30 of whom Marcus Chalfen 
scathingly remarks that she lacks the ‘head’ for ‘hard science’31: 
only conceding that ‘she’s sharp in a way, but it’s the menial 
work, the hard grafting, that she’s good at – she’d make a lab 
assistant maybe’.32 The Chalfens, then, in Smith’s novel, func-
tion as a collective caricature of the heteronormative logics of 
the white, middle- class family, within a reproductive futurity 
anchored in a linear, deterministic and racist understanding of 
inheritance and progress. They are, reports Irie Jones, ‘[l]ike 
clones of each other’, and ‘their dinner table was an exercise in 
mirrored perfection, Chalfenism and all its principles reflecting 
itself infinitely’.33 This image of uninterrupted Chalfenism, 
receding into eternity, is exemplified best when Joyce Chalfen 
parades the daguerreotypes of her ‘grand old family’ in front of 
Clara and Irie Jones.34 As historical artefacts, the daguerreotypes 
participate in the work of constructing history: providing a mate-
rial means of reinforcing a teleological relationship between past 
and present, rooted in a linear, deterministic understanding of 
genetic inheritance. Standing in front of the picture of Marcus’ 
grandfather, Dr Solomon Chalfen, Joyce announces that the ‘first 
time Marcus showed me that picture, I knew I wanted to marry 
him’.35 Joyce characterises her husband’s appeal as precisely that 
of stability and linear, teleological progress, anchored in a belief 
in the direct, genetic inheritance of character and intellect. As 
she goes on to note, making this eugenic subtext explicit: ‘you’ve 
got to suspect it’s in the genes, haven’t you? All these brains. I 
mean, nurture just won’t explain it’.36 For Joyce, as for Marcus 
himself, their family history is indicative of their heteronormative 
future: a historical, reproductive sequence, whose continuation 
will beget further white, middle class, Chalfen ‘intellectuals’, in 
the unceasing transmission of the very genetic material that has 
supposedly fashioned such individuals.37
The Chalfens thus embody what Elizabeth Freeman charac-
terises as chronobiopolitics, a term which describes the norma-
tive social, familial and psychological structures that support the 
standard, linear arrangement of time. Chronobiopolitics offers an 
ordered and sequential progression of events which make up the 
teleological schemes of living, including ‘marriage, accumulation 
of health and wealth for the future, reproduction, childrearing, 
and death’.38 Freeman’s definition of reproductive futurity, then, 
implicates both capitalism and heterosexuality into the logics of 
inheritance, yet it also highlights the role played by inheritance 
as the basis of a naturalised, sociopolitical order. These arrange-
ments of living, in turn, structure the logic of inheritance: ‘rather 
than just the transfer of private property along heteroreproduc-
tive lines, inheritance becomes the familial and collective legacy 
from which a group will draw a properly political future—be it 
national, ethnic, or something else’.39 In the case of the Chalfens, 
this political future is anchored in the concept of direct genetic 
transmission and its determining influence on intellect, character 
and opportunity.
The genealogical thinking of Marcus Chalfen and his family, 
rooted in a narrow, deterministic conception of genetic inher-
itance, and supportive of the pervading chronobiopolitical 
regime, exists in tension with the more mutable understanding 
of Irie Jones. Whereas Joyce Chalfen revels in a linear, teleo-
logical understanding of inheritance and the generational privi-
lege it would entail, for Irie Jones, the question of deterministic, 
genetic inheritance is more troubled. Jones is ‘intent on fighting 
her genes’, which she views as an unwanted reminder of her 
otherness.40 A lack of representation within her wider culture 
leads her to feel like she is a misfit: ‘There was England, a 
gigantic mirror, and there was Irie, without reflection. A stranger 
in a strange land’.41 Though, like Joyce Chalfen, Irie Jones uses 
the language of heredity, it is not similarly deployed to express 
satisfaction with a teleological conception of genetic transmis-
sion. Rather, it is used to name the enemy that she feels she must 
overcome—Jones is ‘intent on transformation, intent on fighting 
her genes’.42 She is depicted as ‘unwilling to settle for genetic 
fate; waiting instead for her transformation from Jamaican 
hourglass […] to English Rose’.43 This attempt to refuse ‘roots’ 
seems most obviously realised in the birth of Irie’s daughter: a 
child who ‘can never be mapped exactly nor spoken of with any 
certainty’.44 For Jones, her child, whose father could be either 
Majid or Millat Iqbal, seems to live beyond genetic prescription 
of the kind embraced by the Chalfens.45
Yet, though Irie Jones’ child hints at the possibility of a more 
heterogenous future, the present of the novel portrays her 
daughter as the lone exception to the seemingly deterministic 
rule of history and heredity. Rather than the child and the future 
she perhaps represents, it is Marcus Chalfen, racialised science 
and the idea of history repeating itself with which the novel 
concludes. Portrayed as at best oblivious, or at worst indifferent, 
to his mentor’s embrace of eugenics and racialised science, 
Marcus Chalfen is repeatedly shown to believe that science is 
a privileged form, whose meaning is separate from any concept 
of racialisation. Even when the potential for racism in science is 
directly pointed out to him—for example, during an encounter 
with an unnamed reader of his work at an airport—he still fails 
to recognise the racial thinking which remains operative in his 
own discipline: ‘You’ve got to be seriously naïve if you don’t 
think the West intend on using this on the East, on the arabs’.46 
Calling into question Chalfen’s thinking about science in a 
contextless fashion, the nameless reader offers a stark warning 
of the dangers inherent in such developments in genetic engi-
neering, if they are not accompanied by an acute awareness of 
the risks that they can pose:
They talk about leaps and bounds in the field of medicine yada yada 
yada, but bottom line, if someone knows how to eliminate “undesir-
able” qualities in people, do you think some government’s not going 
to do it? I mean what’s undesirable? There’s just something a little 
fascist in the whole deal … I guess it’s a good book but where are we 
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mean, if you’re Indian like me you’ve got something to worry about, 
yeah?47
It is only Chalfen’s privilege, both of class and ethnicity, and 
a self- serving commitment to the supposedly apolitical nature 
of science, that allows him to dismiss this encounter as merely a 
manifestation of ‘the usual neo- fascist tabloid fantasies’.48 Secure 
in his privilege and self- regard, Chalfen can ignore his reader’s 
worries concerning the possibility of genetically policing sexual 
and racialised characteristics. Much like Babel Tower, then, 
White Teeth underscores the naivety and limitations of its prin-
cipal advocate for genetic determinism in his refusal to engage 
with the wider meaning of genetic science.
As with Byatt’s portrayal of Gerard Wijnnobel, Smith’s novel 
likewise presents Marcus Chalfen’s own understanding of 
genetics and its cultural influence as dangerously, even comically, 
irresponsible. When issues surrounding the potential political 
and social meaning of science are mooted, Chalfen, like Byatt’s 
vice chancellor, is all too quick to disregard such conjecture as 
mere social constructivism—the work of ‘strange French men 
who think truth is a function of language, or that history is 
interpretive and science metaphorical’.49 Chalfen’s caricature 
of social constructivism fails, however, to fully acknowledge or 
adequately engage with a critique of science as wholly objective 
and separate from its social context. As in Babel Tower, then, the 
inability of the scientist to perceive the cultural meaning of the 
genetic breakthroughs he pursues undermines the epistemolog-
ical authority of science within the novel and remains an abiding 
source of narrative tension.
METAPHORICAL SCIENCE: GENETICS, INFORMATION AND 
ANALOGY
Science studies has done much to show how metaphors have 
influenced the history of science, shaping research questions, 
models and practices.50 As Lewontin observes, given the consti-
tutive power of metaphor, scientists must be ‘conscious of the 
metaphorical content of our words and not be carried away 
when we write of the “cell machinery” which “reads” the DNA 
during the process of “development”’.51 As both Lily Kay and 
Evelyn Fox Keller have shown, the particular metaphors that 
were used to illustrate the relationships between DNA, RNA, 
proteins and organismic bodies were informatic in nature.52 For 
Kay, this representation of heredity, and indeed life, in terms of 
information, did not derive from the internal logics of genetics, 
nor did it comprise an outcome of the elucidation of the archi-
tecture of the double- helix in 1953.53 Rather, she contends, the 
linguistic tropes and textual metaphors of the life sciences that 
were central to the semiotic formulation of the genetic code 
were transported into molecular biology from cybernetics, infor-
mation theory, electronic computing, and control and commu-
nication systems—technosciences that were deeply embedded 
within military experiences of World War II and the Cold War.54 
As she notes, notions of information, message and code were 
being inscribed into biology and genetics as early as the mid- 
1940s, accompanying the rise of information theory, cybernetics 
and computing.55
These informatic metaphors in turn serve to reinforce concep-
tions of genetic determinism and reductionism, promoting a 
linear model of life in which DNA operates as script, blueprint 
and information cache. As Fox Keller notes, in a computer age, 
informatic metaphors meant that DNA could be imagined as a 
software programme executed in the creation of an organism.56 
Crucially, as Fox Keller observes, such metaphors also led to an 
insistence on unidirectional causality, (and) its repudiation of the 
possibility of a substantive influence on genes, either from their 
external or from their intracellular or intercellular environment. 
Instead of circular feedback, it promised a linear structure of 
causal influence, from the central office of DNA to the outlying 
subsidiaries of the protein factory. To this end, they appropri-
ated the cybernetic term information but used it in its colloquial 
rather than in its technical sense.57
The very metaphors, then, through which DNA was 
conceived, in turn shaped the nature of the relationship that was 
imagined between gene, organism and environment, more so 
than any evidentiary basis. Even in the present moment, when 
a genomic understanding of DNA is increasingly being super-
seded by a postgenomic conception that emphasises epigenetic 
factors, the lingering influence of informatic metaphors can still 
be observed. As Jenny Reardon and others have noted, the post-
genomic era is one that is even more informed by the logics and 
practices of information than the periods of genomic history that 
preceded it.58 In an era of extreme globalisation and ‘informatic 
capitalism’, biotechnological enterprise has become inextricable 
from the operations of the wider regimes of capital.59 Biomedi-
cine now reaches into the lives of people as it never has before, in 
the form of human genome databases and biobanks that facilitate 
the marketing of inexpensive and consumer- targeted sequencing 
and screening techniques.60 In this respect, the conception of 
DNA as a form of biological instruction has never really abated. 
If anything, the growing transformation of information into a 
commodity has only encouraged the dominance of informatic 
metaphors within the field of biomedicine.
In Babel Tower, it is Wijnnobel’s friend, Vincent Hodgkiss, 
who draws attention to the potential dangers and intellectual 
pitfalls of the use of informatic analogies in regard to genetic 
thinking. When Wijnnobel hosts a dinner party, he gathers 
together a range of scientists whose fields of expertise span the 
cognitive sciences, including neurochemistry, psychology and 
artificial intelligence. One of the principal topics of conversa-
tion among the attending academics is the possible existence of 
a memory molecule or ‘elusive engram’.61 Popularised by the 
pioneering psychologist Karl Lashley, the concept of an engram 
functions as a placeholder for the theoretical possibility that 
memory, as information, is somehow stored directly within the 
nervous system in some material form. It is this viewpoint which, 
the narrator observes, is broadly, if cautiously, endorsed by the 
gathered cognitive scientists:
The idea is that it is possible that learned information, as well as 
genetic coded information, might be retained in and transmitted by 
very large molecules, such as the DNA and the RNA. And this idea 
received reinforcement from the immunological study of proteins, 
since antibodies recognise intruders into organisms, remember them, 
encode the information in some way, and prepare themselves to resist 
subsequent invaders. So we wonder in turn, if the roots of our own 
memories, the structure of our own consciousness, are to be found in 
these amazing macromolecules.62
The conception of genetic material that such a possibility 
relies on is that of an information cache, encoded using the four- 
letter language of the DNA base pairs: an understanding that, in 
emphasising the equivalence of information above all, suggests 
that it is possible that complex phenomena, such as memory, or 
indeed language and consciousness, could be directly encoded 
within an organism’s genome as yet another form of biologically 
inscribed information.
While there emerges a broad, if tempered enthusiasm for the 
eventual discovery of the engram among those gathered at Wijn-
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from the attending cognitive scientists, but rather from Vincent 
Hodgkiss. A student of the humanities, whose own area of 
research concerns the study of Wittgenstein, Hodgkiss is highly 
critical of the scientific speculation engaged in by the other 
guests:
The question is, whether the word information means the same in 
all cases, that of immunology, that of DNA, that of the mind of the 
scientist building a computer, or whether you are all thinking by anal-
ogy, which is dangerous.63
For Hodgkiss, the peril posed by analogy is clear. While 
thinking of DNA as an encoded language conceptualises a 
highly complex aspect of scientific inquiry, it also highlights 
the danger of how seductively imprecise such an analogy can 
be. Imprecision, for Hodgkiss, can in turn lead to the drawing 
of false equivalences—in this case, that information means the 
same thing in each instance under discussion. Byatt’s treatment, 
via Hodgkiss, of the informatic analogies concerning the DNA 
molecule thus parallels the critiques voiced within science and 
technology studies such as those discussed earlier. It highlights 
how the dangers inherent in a belief that DNA constitutes infor-
mation above all else were present in the early days of clas-
sical genetics and have only become more entrenched in the 
intervening decades. Both Babel Tower and White Teeth, then, 
serve to illustrate how the particular meaning of the ‘informa-
tion’ contained within DNA is highly contextual in nature and 
shaped in relation to a given environment and its sociopolitical 
concerns.
ALL HER LIFE: MEANING AND THE ASYNCHRONOUS IN 
MONKEY’S UNCLE
Jenny Diski’s Monkey’s Uncle likewise offers a profoundly crit-
ical portrayal of the meaningfulness of considering DNA as infor-
mation. A surrealist, historical novel, Diski’s text is divided into 
three interwoven narrative strands centred around the fictitious 
geneticist, Charlotte FitzRoy, and the historical figures Charles 
Darwin and Captain Robert FitzRoy. The novel’s first strand, set 
in 1990, focuses on a sustained period of mental ill health for 
Charlotte FitzRoy, following the sudden death of her daughter. 
Consumed by the delusion that she is the direct descendant of 
Captain Robert FitzRoy, Charlotte FitzRoy, like Gerard Wijnnobel 
and Marcus Chalfen, is seduced by the explanatory potential of a 
linear, deterministic understanding of genomic inheritance. She 
seeks to explain her own experiences of depression by appealing 
to her supposed genetic inheritance. Reflecting this neat, tele-
ological relationship of past and present, is the inclusion of a 
second narrative strand which traces Robert FitzRoy’s voyages 
on the HMS Beagle with the young Charles Darwin in the 1830s 
and his subsequent suicide in 1865. Yet, complicating any neat 
genealogy of past and contemporaneous present is the inclusion 
of the novel’s asynchronous, third strand, in which Charlotte 
FitzRoy herself encounters an ageing Darwin. Through this use 
of asynchronicity, Monkey’s Uncle both explores the explanatory 
potential of a neo- Darwinian understanding of inheritance and 
disrupts the established temporal order it would require, blur-
ring any linear, causal and genealogical relationship of Victorian 
past and late- 20th century present.
It is through such linear, genomic understandings of inher-
itance that Charlotte FitzRoy initially attempts to explain her 
experiences of depression and mental ill health. She becomes 
obsessed by the notion that she is a recipient of Robert FitzRoy’s 
genetic madness:
So much of FitzRoy’s story, his character, chimed in with details of 
her past she was more or less convinced by the time she had finished 
her first reading of the book, and when she looked at the pictures of 
FitzRoy young and old, and also of Castlereagh, she could no longer 
doubt that she was a FitzRoy. The physical evidence was compelling – 
the grey eyes, the sharp nose, the receded chin. They were all present 
in her, and, she could see, to some extent in both Julian and Miranda. 
She couldn’t deny that they must have those chromosomes in com-
mon, but it was other, less evident chromosomes which gripped her 
mind.64
Charlotte FitzRoy thus attempts to justify her belief by refer-
ence to a series of observable physical traits—‘grey eyes and 
aquiline noses’—of whose direct genetic origin and expression 
she can be reasonably certain, as well as the fact that compa-
rable genetic material must be shared by herself and her two 
children.65 Having established the probable genetic similarity of 
such physical traits, however, Charlotte FitzRoy then attempts to 
infer the presence of shared character traits, such as ‘a statistical 
tendency to cut their own throats’, as being likewise founded in 
a genomic understanding of genetic inheritance.66
It is in attempting to substantiate this latter assertion of a 
shared, genetic character between Charlotte FitzRoy and her 
supposed ancestor, that the explanatory power of her genomic 
understanding of inheritance begins to break down. Convinced 
that ‘the laboratory now seemed the only place where real 
answers to her questions might be found’, she attempts to locate 
the specific gene that she believes to be responsible for her 
familial history of mental ill health.67 FitzRoy’s hopes, however, 
are dashed by the sheer scale of the task before her, and she 
quickly becomes frustrated with the lack of meaning inherent in 
genetic material. As the narrator observes, ‘the messages were 
there, all right, and yet they didn’t speak’.68 Contemporaneous 
technologies of genetic sequencing allow Charlotte FitzRoy, ‘like 
a wanton boy’, to take her chromosomes and ‘break them apart 
piece by piece, stain them, slice them, clone them, and yet never 
find the way to put them back together that would amount to 
the story she was looking for’.69 The narrative which Charlotte 
FitzRoy wishes to construct, then, is one that relies on a genomic 
understanding of DNA as a form of information with an inherent 
historical meaning, connecting her to the past through the linear 
continuum of genetic inheritance:
Increasingly, it was Charlotte’s silent, self- obsessed belief that she had 
been doomed from the moment she was born. From before that mo-
ment, in fact. Her doom, if it was true, could be traced back (with the 
benefit of hindsight and an informed guess on the basis of those grey 
eyes and aquiline nose) to 1769 at least.70
Though Charlotte FitzRoy, like Gerard Wijnnobel, was 
convinced that ‘somewhere’ among her genome was ‘the truth, 
a pattern, an explanation, the story of Charlotte’s future and 
history’s past’, the task of attributing a stable meaning to this 
vast volume of genetic information, independent of environ-
mental influence, proves to be beyond her capacity to decipher 
or inscribe.71 As she is finally forced to concede, the karyotype 
‘pictures she had made of her innermost self were, in reality, 
useless as a practical aid, and the sense of inevitable doom 
went on increasing in spite of the hours she spent staring at 
the evidence’.72 Though Charlotte FitzRoy may wish other-
wise, the genetic language that she seeks to understand has no 
certain meaning absent of its referent. Viewed in the abstract, 
she lacks the environmental context necessary to begin making 
sense of the sheer volume of genetic material with which she is 
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infinitely long tickertape produced by a monkey on a typewriter 
with only four keys’.73 By the conclusion of Diski’s narrative, 
FitzRoy is portrayed as having largely abandoned any genomic 
understanding of genetic inheritance.
The depth of Charlotte FitzRoy’s intellectual transforma-
tion is perhaps best illustrated in the trajectory of her asyn-
chronous interaction with Charles Darwin, on whose work the 
foundation of her initial, neo- Darwinian, genomic obsession 
once rested. FitzRoy is portrayed as being initially enamoured 
by her discussions with Darwin, which encompass politics, 
religion and society, and reflect her intellectual indebtedness 
to his work. By the conclusion of the narrative, however, 
Charlotte FitzRoy is shown to have become discontented 
with the meaning and value of Darwin’s theories, and with 
the disdain which he shows for the beliefs and struggles of 
her putative ancestor. Defending Robert FitzRoy’s emotional 
investment in a caring creation, Charlotte FitzRoy argues that 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, though supported by develop-
ments in modern genetics, was still not necessarily a social 
right. As FitzRoy notes, the ‘poor are still poor, the confused 
are still confused, and science has provided no more comfort 
or certainty than religion did’.74 Just as with Babel Tower 
and White Teeth, in Diski’s novel the seductive explanatory 
potential of neo- Darwinism is presented, but a tension remains 
between the reductive teleology it offers and the wider social 
questions of its value and meaning. In its very asynchronicity, 
Charlotte FitzRoy’s encounter with Darwin comprises a 
temporal disruption, which interrupts the notion of science’s 
teleological and sequential progress, undermining its claims to 
authority and challenging what such transhistorical scientific 
paradigms can mean, absent of their social context.
POSTGENOMIC INFORMATION AND THE CONTINUED 
PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
These unsettled issues of the meaning of genetic information, 
explored in the three novels discussed, have carried over into 
the postgenomic age. The term ‘postgenomic’ applies broadly 
to any biological research after the completion of the major 
genome projects that employs genomic technologies and 
draw on genomic knowledge.75 Among the many possibilities 
presented by the decoding of the human genome has been 
the expansion of the type and availability of genetic analysis. 
The falling cost and increasing speed of whole- genome tech-
nologies means that these techniques are now ubiquitous in a 
variety of private and public enterprises.76 Such whole- genome 
technologies include human genome databases and biobanks; 
microarray chips for assessing the expression of hundreds of 
thousands of genes in human tissue; rapid, inexpensive, next- 
generation genome sequencing technologies; bioinformatic 
and computational advances in genome- wide association 
studies; and direct- to- consumer, mail- order mass sequencing 
and genome analysis facilities.77 Such information derived 
from genetic science has now moved out of the rarefied and 
specialised domains of biomedicine, into more general cultural 
circulation where it forms a key part of a biologically informed, 
public discourse of self- fashioning.
Tracking the broader, social transmission of the logics and 
techniques of genetic science—the social life of DNA—we can 
apprehend how genetics is increasingly relied on to answer 
fundamental questions, not only about human identity but 
also about national and political community, social justice and 
collective memory.78 Jenny Reardon summed up this post-
genomic condition as the struggle of meaning making:
Now that we have “the human genome” sequence, what does it 
mean? Tremendous feats of biomolecular engineering produced the 
sequence. However, what was the route between this technological 
feat and meaningful knowledge that might foster life and human un-
derstanding? In the decade after the completion of the HGP, this turn 
to the question of meaning—the question of the uses, significance, 
and value of the human genome sequence—marks what I call the 
postgenomic condition.79
Indeed, the question of the meaning of genetic information 
has become even more important in a postgenomic age which, 
in the era of big data, is one increasingly divorced from the 
human scale. As Reardon proceeds to explain, the making of 
meaning seems an ever- more necessary and precarious topic, 
now ‘that the task is no longer sequencing the human genome 
but interpreting it’.80 The reliance in the biological sciences on 
digital computing and data management results in a ‘bias toward 
automated approaches—such as whole genome analyses—[that] 
affects what we can know about genomes and the quality with 
which we know it’.81 Computers and informatics might provide 
excellent tools for storing, managing and looking for patterns in 
massive amounts of genomic data, but the transformation of this 
genomic data into meaningful knowledge still requires humans 
to make judgements about which algorithms to use and about 
which data to input.82
In highlighting the difficult and contentious nature of the 
conversion of genetic data into meaning, the three novels 
addressed in this essay all use the historical fiction form as 
a means of illustrating how the question of the meaning of 
genetics is one of contested translation. From the playground 
to the university, the laboratory to the airport, the potential 
meanings of genetics are shown to circulate in society and are 
used to inform choices and understandings surrounding ques-
tions of identity, family and nationality. Through literary tech-
niques such as asynchronicity, anachronism and repetition, the 
novels in this study both highlight the seductive, explanatory 
potential of a linear, deterministic understanding, and refuse 
any simple or singular teleology of genetics. In so doing, they 
show how the legibility of genetic data and stable inscription 
of meaning remain contested. Neither history nor genetics are 
shown to be settled, but rather function as palimpsests whose 
significance must be interpreted and curated. Though these 
texts are not in themselves postgenomic—they do not imagine 
the postgenomic era to come—they do highlight how the 
logics and cultural capital of genetics has always been, and 
must continue to be, disrupted, refused and undermined.
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